This contention of the leisure-class spokesmen of the
humanities seems to be substantially sound. In point of
substantial fact, the gratification and the culture, or the
spiritual attitude or habit of mind, resulting from an habitual
contemplation of the anthropomorphism, clannishness, and
leisurely self-complacency of the gentleman of an early day, or
from a familiarity with the animistic superstitions and the
exuberant truculence of the Homeric heroes, for instance, is,
aesthetically considered, more legitimate than the corresponding
results derived from a matter-of-fact knowledge of things and a
contemplation of latter-day civic or workmanlike efficiency.
There can be but little question that the first-named habits have
the advantage in respect of aesthetic or honorific value, and
therefore in respect of the "worth" which is made the basis of
award in the comparison. The content of the canons of taste, and
more particularly of the canons of honor, is in the nature of
things a resultant of the past life and circumstances of the
race, transmitted to the later generation by inheritance or by
tradition; and the fact that the protracted dominance of a
predatory, leisure-class scheme of life has profoundly shaped the
habit of mind and the point of view of the race in the past, is a
sufficient basis for an aesthetically legitimate dominance of
such a scheme of life in very much of what concerns matters of
taste in the present.
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